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AI quality

How we plan to measure
whether AI verdicts are right

Genox hasn't launched yet, so we have no measurements to show. We're doing it in a different order and publishing first what we'll measure, on which samples, and who grades it. We'll publish the numbers after PoC and after launch.

Metrics

We track eight metrics

Each one is measured against individual verdicts produced by the Threat Correlator.
The "Published" column below has no numbers yet because we haven't measured anything.

MetricWhat it looks atBetter whenPublished
Verdict accuracyHow often the AI verdict matches the analyst's final verdictHigherAfter PoC
False positive · false negative rateBenign activity called a threat, and real threats that were closedLowerAfter PoC
Missing evidence rateShare of verdicts not tied to any evidenceTarget is 0After PoC
Tool call accuracyWhether the tools and arguments used during investigation were correctHigherAfter PoC
Fabricated output detectionWhether the logs cited in a verdict actually existFewer mismatchesAfter PoC
Human approval rate · reversal rateShare of approval requests that were approved, and share undone after approvalFewer reversalsAfter launch
Replay consistencyWhether the verdict stays the same when rerun with the same input, model and policyHigherAfter PoC
Processing timeFrom alert received to verdict, and from verdict to approvalShorterAfter launch

Approval rate and processing time only mean something once analysts are working in a live environment, so we've held them until after launch. We still record them during PoC.

How we measure

Every metric has a set sample, grader and cadence

A single published number tells you nothing about how it was produced.
Open each item to see the definition, the method, and why we track it separately.

Verdict accuracy, or how often the AI agrees with the analyst's final call

Definition. The share of verdicts where the label the AI assigned (true positive, false positive, needs further investigation) and the severity match what the analyst finally confirmed.

Method. Every verdict rated High or above is checked. For the rest we draw a random sample each month. The reference is the customer analyst's confirmed verdict. Where the customer hasn't confirmed one, two Genox analysts grade it independently. If they disagree, a third analyst decides, and we record the number of disagreements too. People tend to follow the AI once they've seen its answer, so sample grading is done on a screen that hides the AI verdict and confidence.

Why. A single overall match rate gets inflated by the large volume of low-risk alerts. That's why we report it broken down by severity.

False positive and false negative rates

Definition. A false positive is a case the AI called a threat and the analyst confirmed as benign. A false negative is a case the AI closed as benign or Low that later turned out to be a threat.

Method. False positives are counted on the same sample as verdict accuracy. False negatives are found two ways. Each month analysts reopen and review a sample of alerts the AI closed. We also trace cases found later in incident investigations or threat hunts back to the original alerts. Counts from the two routes are reported separately.

Why. When a SOC AI closes an alert, analysts don't look at it again. Counting false negatives means counting what you don't know about, so the number will always come out lower than reality. We say so in the report.

Missing evidence rate, meaning verdicts issued with no evidence (target 0)

Definition. The share of verdicts with no linked evidence at all, or with reasoning statements that don't point to any evidence ID.

Method. Every verdict is checked automatically. The verdict trace format requires an evidence ID for each reasoning statement. If one is missing, the verdict is marked "insufficient evidence" and handed to a person.

Why. With the format enforcing it, zero looks like a given. We count anyway because paths that skip the check do appear. Usually it's a fallback path taken when an investigation step times out, or exception handling code. In any month the number isn't zero, we publish the cause and the fix alongside it.

Tool call accuracy

Definition. Whether the AI picked the right tools during investigation (log search, asset lookup, sandbox run, threat intel lookup), whether arguments such as hostname and time range were correct, whether it skipped any calls it needed, and whether it attempted calls outside its allowed scope.

Method. Genox engineers grade a sample of investigations step by step. Attempts to call tools outside the allowed scope are counted automatically across all verdicts, with no sampling.

Why. When we trace wrong verdicts back, the error is more often in a lookup step than in the reasoning. Set a log search window 15 minutes too short and you get a conclusion that there's "no evidence." Out-of-scope calls are counted on their own because they're the same risk as LLM06 Excessive Agency in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025.

Fabricated output detection, or checking that cited logs really exist

Definition. We check every log line, event ID, file hash and path cited in a verdict trace against the raw data actually collected. A citation to a log that doesn't exist, or one whose content differs, counts as a mismatch.

Method. Every verdict is checked automatically. We look up the cited location in the raw data store and compare hashes. If any one fails, the verdict is put on hold and passed to an analyst. We publish the number of holds and how many of them were actual fabrications.

Why. LLMs can make up plausible log lines. OWASP covers this as LLM09 Misinformation, and NIST AI 600-1 calls it confabulation. This check only confirms that a citation exists, though. A real log that was misread is caught by verdict accuracy.

Human approval rate and post-approval reversal rate

Definition. Among recommendations that need approval, such as host isolation or account lockout, the share that analysts approved, modified or rejected. The reversal rate is the share of approved and executed actions later undone with "incorrect verdict" as the reason.

Method. We count every record from the approval screen. Undoing an action requires picking a reason, which separates releases made because of business impact from releases made because the verdict was wrong. We also keep the time from request to approval.

Why. An approval rate stuck near 100% could be a good sign. It could also mean analysts are clicking approve without reading the evidence. That's why we also look at whether approval times cluster at a few seconds.

Replay consistency

Definition. The share of verdicts that come out with the same label and severity when rerun using the input, model version and policy version saved at verdict time. We don't compare the wording, because there's no guarantee the same sentences will come back.

Method. Each month we rerun a sample of past verdicts. Before changing a model or policy version, we run the set of past verdicts on the new version and do a regression comparison of how the results shift.

Why. A verdict whose conclusion changes on rerun was sitting on a borderline, and a person should look at it again. High consistency doesn't mean the verdict is right. Repeating the same mistake also scores high.

Processing time

Definition. Three intervals: alert received to verdict trace created, verdict to approval, and alert received to action executed.

Method. Counted across all records from system logs. Instead of the mean, we report the median together with the 90th percentile (p90).

Why. A handful of long investigations drag the mean around. A fast verdict is worthless if it's also less accurate, so processing time always sits in the same table as accuracy.

Before release

Testing we run before changing a model or policy

Operational metrics only tell you something got worse after an incident. So before switching versions we run three things first. If any of them comes out worse than the previous version, we don't deploy.

A held-out evaluation set

We keep a separate evaluation set that has never been used for training or prompt tuning. It's built from public security datasets and from records of ATT&CK techniques reproduced with public tests such as Atomic Red Team in the isolated Research Lab environment. Nobody looks at this set during development. Once you start looking at it, scores start coming out better than they really are.

Attacking our own AI

We attack the Genox SOC AI the same way we test customers' AI. We plant instructions in log fields such as User-Agent, filenames and email subjects to push it toward lower verdicts, and we try to get it to call tools outside its scope or cite evidence that doesn't exist. Successful attacks are saved with their exact inputs and responses and go into the next evaluation set.

A Korean prompt injection set

Most public injection sets are in English and barely cover evasion in Korean. We're building our own set that mixes decomposed Hangul letters, initial consonants only, mixed Korean and English, altered word spacing, full-width characters, and role-play in honorific speech. We test it by planting it where it actually shows up in Korean SOC work: approval document filenames, HWP document bodies (the word processor format widely used in Korea), and Korean email subjects.

Evaluation set scores are not the same as production performance. The mix of alerts in a customer environment differs from the sets we build, and that gap only shows up when we measure again on customer data during PoC.

Monthly report

Customers see these numbers
in their monthly report

As stated in the Trust Center, the report includes false positive rates and missed cases.
We add the measurement conditions as well.

  • The eight metrics above broken down by severity, with sample size and who graded them
  • The verdict trace for each false positive and false negative. The table links straight to the original records instead of showing only numbers
  • Actions reversed after approval, and the reasons they were undone
  • Verdicts held by the fabrication check, and how each was resolved
  • Model and policy versions changed that month, and the regression results run before each change
  • How many cases analysts disagreed on
Monthly quality report · example layoutNot yet measured
AccuracyHigh and above · all verdictsNot measured
AccuracyMedium and below · random sampleNot measured
False neg.Closed alerts reviewed / found later (shown separately)Not measured
No evidenceTarget 0 · cause attached if not 0Not measured
FabricationHeld / actual mismatchesNot measured
ReversalsIncorrect verdict / business impactNot measured
ReplayLabel · severity match (wording not compared)Not measured

An example showing how the report is laid out. It is not a real customer report and contains no measured values.

Limits

What these measurements can't tell you

When you publish a number, writing down what it doesn't say cuts down on misreadings.

The analyst verdict we grade against can be wrong too

Accuracy measures whether the AI reached the same verdict as the analyst. If the analyst was wrong, a correct AI verdict still counts as a miss. That's why we also publish how often analysts disagreed with each other, and those cases get a separate review.

False negatives will be undercounted

We can only count what was eventually found. Attacks that nobody ever noticed aren't in this number.

Numbers are hard to compare across customers

Each customer collects different log types and has different alert rules and assets. With the same engine, Company A and Company B will see different false positive rates, and that difference doesn't reflect a difference in engine performance. Any figure we publish comes with its measurement conditions.

In months with small samples, the numbers swing widely

If there are only a few high-risk verdicts in a month, one wrong call moves the rate a lot. We report sample size and confidence intervals along with the rate.

A consistent replay doesn't mean a correct verdict

Replay consistency only shows whether a verdict is stable. A verdict that's wrong for the same reason every time also scores high. Whether it's right is covered by verdict accuracy.

Frameworks

Public frameworks we drew on

We chose the metrics based on the requirements and risk categories in the public documents below.
ISO/IEC 42001 certification is in preparation and has not been obtained.

DocumentRelevant partWhat it maps to on this page
NIST AI RMF 1.0 (AI 100-1)MEASURE function: measure and document AI system risks and trustworthiness characteristics using defined methodsPublished definition · sample · cadence for each metric
NIST AI 600-1Confabulation risk (generating plausible but false content) in the Generative AI ProfileFabricated output detection
ISO/IEC 42001:20239.1 Monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluationMonthly report · regression comparison
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025LLM01 Prompt Injection, LLM06 Excessive Agency, LLM09 MisinformationInjection evaluation set · tool call accuracy · fabrication detection

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